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I.  INTRODUCTION
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”2
For centuries, the Supreme Court has written opinions that have had a substantial 
impact on the procedural and substantive law of our legal system.  Through these 
opinions, the Court addresses a particular issue in controversy and provides guidance 
to the lower courts regarding how to dispose of the issue.  Sometimes the issue is not 
thoroughly examined in the Court opinion and lingering questions remain for the 
lower courts to determine.  The lower courts use the guidance provided from the 
Court opinion, coupled with their own knowledge, to help resolve these lingering 
questions.  
The testimonial privilege between a psychotherapist and a patient is one such 
issue that the Supreme Court has examined, but the Court has left lingering questions 
for the lower courts to determine.  In the landmark case of Jaffee v. Redmond,3 the 
Supreme Court examined the issue of whether there is a testimonial privilege 
between a psychotherapist and a patient.  The Court held that a privilege exists, but 
declined to define possible exceptions to the privilege.4  The Court did, however, 
mention that there might be some possible situations where the privilege could be 
circumscribed.5  The opinion has resulted in unanswered questions for the lower 
courts regarding the possible situations where such an exception exists. 
With little guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have begun to 
determine the situations where an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
is permissible.  The appellate courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether to 
acknowledge the various exceptions.6  Specifically, one disagreement is whether a 
dangerous-patient exception is available when a patient has revealed information to a 
psychotherapist regarding an intention to harm or kill a third party.7  The Tenth 
                                                                
2Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
3518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
4Id. at 18.  
5Id. at 18 n.19.   
6Compare United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining “to 
recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege”) with
United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that there is an exception 
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege if “the threat was serious when it was uttered . . . [and] 
its disclosure was the only means of averting harm”). 
7Compare Chase, 340 F.3d 978 with Glass, 133 F.3d 1356.  
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Circuit, in United States v. Glass, recognized that “there are situations in which the 
privilege must give way.”8  One situation is “if a serious threat of harm to the patient 
or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.”9  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, has recently refused to recognize the existence of a 
dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.10  The Ninth 
Circuit based its decision on four factors: (1) the “States’ Experiences”,11 (2) the 
“Differing Purposes of State Confidentiality Laws and the Federal Testimonial 
Privilege”,12 (3) the 1972 Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence,13 and (4) 
Public Policy.14
II.  THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE A PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has the authority to create a privilege of a witness “governed 
by the principles of common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.”15  In civil 
cases, when state substantive law applies, the privilege of a witness is determined by 
state law.16  Initially, the Supreme Court proposed to Congress specific privileges to 
become statutory law.17 A privilege between a psychotherapist and a patient was one 
of the specific proposed privileges.18  Congress determined not to establish specific 
privileges, but to allow the Court to recognize privileges through case law and court 
opinions.19
III.  RECOGNIZING A PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court in Jaffee recognized a privilege between a psychotherapist 
and patient based on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.20  The privilege 
prevents a psychotherapist from being compelled to testify in court regarding 
information received from the patient during diagnosis or treatment.21  The Court 
defined a “psychotherapist” to include licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and 
social workers.22
                                                                
8Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357. 
9Id.
10Chase, 340 F.3d at 992. 
11Id. at 985. (emphasis in the original). 
12Id. at 986. (emphasis in the original). 
13Id. at 989. 
14Id. at 990. 
15FED. R. EVID. 501. 
16Id.
17See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note. 
18See id.
19See id.
20Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15. 
21Id.
22Id.
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In Jaffee, the petitioner, who was the administrator of the decedent’s estate, filed 
a wrongful death suit in the district court against the respondent, a police officer, 
contending that the officer used excessive force.23  The officer used force in response 
to a police call reporting that a fight had commenced.24  The situation resulted in the 
officer drawing her gun and fatally shooting an individual.25  The officer and 
eyewitnesses presented conflicting testimony regarding the events that occurred 
when the officer arrived at the scene.26  In order to clarify this discrepancy, the 
petitioner sought to retrieve notes recorded by a social worker who counseled the 
officer after the incident.27
The officer and the social worker refused to comply with the discovery requests 
claiming that the information communicated by the officer to the social worker was 
privileged.28  While instructing the jury, the district court stated that the members of 
the jury could infer that the social worker’s notes contained harmful information 
because of the refusal to comply with the discovery requests.29  The jury returned a 
verdict for the petitioner.30  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of 
the district court.31  The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing 
to exclude the communications because it was privileged under the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.32  The circuit court based its decision on the unique relationship 
between a psychotherapist and a patient requiring open communication for treatment, 
a person’s right to privacy under the constitution, and the recognition of some form 
of a privilege by all fifty states.33  The Seventh Circuit followed In re Zungia,34
which balanced the interests of disclosing the communication with the interests of 
nondisclosure.35  The Circuit Court concluded that the interests of encouraging “law 
enforcement officers who are frequently forced to experience traumatic events by the 
very nature of their work to seek qualified professional help” outweighed the interest 
in disclosing the confidential communications in this case.36
                                                                






29Id. at 5-6. 
30Id. at 6. 
31Id. at 6. 
32Id. at 6-7. 
33Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1995). 
34In re Zungia, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983). 
35Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357. 
36Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari37 to determine whether there is a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege because of the discrepancies among the appellate 
courts.38  The Court acknowledged that there is a psychotherapist-patient privilege.39
The Court based its reasoning on a number of principles, including the recognition of 
some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege by all fifty states;40 the necessity of 
confidence and trust to effective psychotherapy;41 and the small “evidentiary benefit 
that would result from the denial of the privilege.”42  The Court rejected the court of 
appeals’ balancing test for determining whether there is an exception to the 
privilege.43  Declining to establish exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, the Court anticipated that there would be some situations “in which the 
privilege must give way . . . .”44
IV.  DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court clarified the issue of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by 
declaring that such a privilege exists.  The decision of the Court to refrain from 
defining the perimeters of the privilege, however, provided the lower courts with the 
opportunity to structure the boundaries of the privilege in light of their own reason 
and experience.  Like any other privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege must 
be construed narrowly in order to ensure a fair trial.45  The federal appellate courts 
and state legislatures have embraced this opportunity and have recognized numerous 
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.46
Recognized exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege include situations 
when the patient’s mental state is at issue in the litigation,47 cases of involuntary 
                                                                
37Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17. 
38See id. (citing United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Doe, 964 
F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (refusing to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege)). 
39Id. at 15. 
40Id. at 12. 
41Id. at 10. 
42Id. at 11. 
43Id. at 17.  
44Id.
45RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 71 (Brunner-Routledge 
2002) (stating that “[e]vidence is the basis of justice-the very essence of a fair trial.”). See,
e.g., Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357 (stating that “testimonial privileges thwarting the search for truth 
should be narrowly construed”). 
46See Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability of Psychotherapists for Breach of Confidentiality, 12 
J.L. & HEALTH 39, 59-60 (1997-98). 
47Id. (citing In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970)). 
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commitment,48 homicide cases,49 and criminal fraud cases.50  The appellate courts 
have not universally adopted these exceptions to the privilege.  
A.  When the Mental State of the Patient is at Issue 
The patient in the psychotherapist-patient relationship is the holder of the 
privilege.51  The patient has the ability to “claim” the privilege in an attempt to 
prevent confidential communications from being elicited at trial.52  The patient also 
has the ability to waive the privilege, explicitly or implicitly, permitting confidential 
communications to be revealed.53  “[T]he most common form of waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is . . . when [the patient’s] . . . condition is an 
element of [a] claim or defense.”54
Numerous exceptions have been created in situations when the patient’s mental 
condition is at “issue.”  One exception to the privilege exists when there is a child 
custody dispute between the parents.55  By disputing custody the parents have placed 
their parental fitness in issue.56  In order to determine the best interests for the child 
the court may have “access to therapy records and to the compelling testimony of the 
therapist.”57  Another exception exists when the patient is a defendant in a criminal 
case and raises the defense of insanity or mental illness.58  “The privilege is also 
waived in a wrongful death action in which the party relies on the deceased’s 
condition as an element of his claim or defense.”59  For example, an alleged victim’s 
mental condition may be an issue if a party claims suicide was the cause of death and 
not a result of the party’s actions.60
B.  Involuntary Commitment Proceedings and Self Defense 
The legislature has created an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
when the psychotherapist seeks to have the patient involuntarily hospitalized.61
                                                                
48Id. at 78. 
49Id. at 59-60 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 14.307(b)(1) (1995)). 
50In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999). 
51SLOVENKO, supra note 45, at 71. 
52Id. at 71-72. 
53Id.
54Id. at 72. 
55Id. at 79. 
56Id. at 78-79. 
57Id.
58Id. at 75.
59Id. at 74. 
60Id.
61Id. at 78. 
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The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence commented, 
“The interests of both patient and public call for a departure from 
confidentiality in commitment proceedings.  Since disclosure is 
authorized only when the doctor determines that hospitalization is needed, 
control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a person in whom 
the patient has already manifested confidence.”62
The legislature created an additional exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in situations where the patient has brought an action against the 
psychotherapist.63
As the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence put it: “The 
exception is required by considerations of fairness and policy when 
questions arise out of dealings between attorney and client, as in cases of 
controversy over attorney’s fees, claims of inadequacy of representation, 
or charges of professional misconduct.”64
C.  Homicide Cases 
An exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been created when the 
patient is the defendant in a criminal homicide case.65  The District of Columbia 
statute which provides for such an exception, states as follows:  
In the Federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia 
courts a . . . mental health professional . . . may not be permitted, without 
the consent of the person afflicted . . . to disclose any information, 
confidential in its nature, that he has acquired in attending a client in a 
professional capacity and that was necessary to enable him to act in that 
capacity, whether the information was obtained from the client or from his 
family or from the person or persons in charge of him.66
The statute provides for an exception in “criminal cases where the accused is 
charged with causing the death of, or inflicting injuries upon, a human being, and the 
disclosure is required in the interests of public justice . . . .”67
D.  Criminal Fraud Cases 
The First Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette)68 held 
that there is a crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The 
case involved alleged false statements made to various financial institutions by the 
                                                                
62Id. (citing Proposed FED. R. EVID. 504). 
63Id. at 88. 
64Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 503 advisory committee’s note). 
65D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307(b) (2003).  
66Id. at § 14-307(a). 
67Id. at § 14-307(b). 
68183 F.3d 71. 
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appellant regarding disabilities he had in order to obtain disability insurance.69  The 
government sought to obtain testimony from two psychiatrists who had met with the 
appellant and were used by him to fraudulently induce payments.70  The court 
enforced the government’s subpoena despite the psychiatrists’ assertions of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.71  On appeal, the appellant contended that a crime-
fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not exist.72  The court of 
appeals rejected the appellant’s argument and held that there was an exception.73
Based on reason and experience, the court determined that there should be an 
exception to the privilege in the case of criminal fraud.74  The court stated that the 
opinion in Jaffee did not intend to create an absolute privilege, leaving the substance 
of the privilege to be decided by future cases.75  The court reasoned that without the 
acknowledgement of a crime-fraud exception, there is a potential for abuse between 
patients and counselors.76  For example, “[p]sychotherapists could use the privilege 
to deflect investigations into health insurance fraud.”77  The court also looked at the 
similarity between the attorney-client privilege and the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege because both relationships rely on a foundation of trust and confidence.78
The court stated that because courts have recognized a crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege to prevent future criminal activity, even though it is based 
on trust and confidence, the court should also recognize an exception to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to prevent future criminal activity, even though it 
too is a relationship based on trust and confidence.79  The court detailed the elements 
that must be satisfied in order for the exception to exist: (1) it must be shown “that 
the client was engaged in (or was planning) criminal or fraudulent activity when the 
attorney-client communications took place; and (2) that the communications were 
intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity.”80
                                                                
69Id. at 72. 
70Id. at 72-73. 
71Id. at 73. 
72Id.
73Id. at 71. 
74Id.
75Id. at 74. 
76Id. at 77. 
77Id.
78Id. at 75-76. 
79Id.
80Id. at 75 (citing United States v. Jacob, 117 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in 
the original). 
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V.  AN ABRUPT HALT IN THE EXPANSION OF RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS:
UNITED STATES V. CHASE
The Ninth Circuit , in United States v. Chase,81 stopped the continuing expansion 
of exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  In Chase, the court declined 
to recognize the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.82  The Ninth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, reversed the decisions of 
the district court and a three-judge panel of the court of appeals and concluded that 
there is no such privilege.83
In Chase, the defendant, during numerous sessions, communicated to his 
psychotherapist that he was planning to kill two FBI agents.84  The psychotherapist 
warned the defendant of her duty to inform the agents of potential harm if she was 
informed of the identities of the FBI agents.85 The psychotherapist sought the advice 
of a superior regarding the threats.86  The supervisor advised her to learn more 
information about the plan.87  Upon further contact with the defendant, the 
psychotherapist feared that the defendant might institute his plan.88  The 
psychotherapist once again sought advice from a superior and also sought advice 
from legal counsel.89  As a result of the meeting, the psychotherapist contacted the 
local authorities and the FBI agents.90 When the defendant became aware that he was 
being investigated, he contacted the clinic where he was seeking treatment.91  He 
spoke with two telephone operators and told them that “people are going to die” if 
the FBI comes to arrest him.92  The defendant was arrested and charged with 
threatening the agents who were en route to execute the search warrant and for 
threatening to murder the two FBI agents.93  At trial, the defendant challenged the 
admissibility of the psychotherapist’s testimony claiming the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.94  The district court admitted the testimony stating that the testimony was 
not privileged because the defendant’s “threats were serious when uttered, that harm 
                                                                
81Chase, 340 F.3d 978. 
82Id. at 992. 
83Id. at 981. 
84Id. at 979-80. 




89Id. at 979. 
90Id. at 980. 
91Id.
92Id.
93Id. at 981. 
94Id.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
560 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:551
was imminent, and that disclosure to authorities was the only means of averting the 
threatened harm.”95 The defendant was found guilty and he appealed.96
The three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district 
court recognizing the dangerous-patient exception.97  The three-judge panel found 
the arguments recognizing an exception to the privilege more compelling than 
disallowing the evidence by the psychotherapist altogether.98  The court stated that 
the recognition of an exception is harmonious with the Court in Jaffee and policy 
considerations.99  The court held that the dangerous-patient exception applies “when 
(1) a threat of harm is serious and imminent and (2) the harm can be averted only by 
means of disclosure by the therapist.”100
The Ninth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, declined to recognize a dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.101  The court first 
addressed the decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,102 which held that a 
psychotherapist has a duty to warn a third party or the authorities of potential harm 
by a patient.103  The court distinguished between the rule established in Tarasoff,
permitting a psychotherapist to disclose confidential information in order to prevent 
harm, and the dangerous-patient testimonial privilege, permitting a psychotherapist 
to disclose confidential information in court.104  The court stated that because the 
states have declined to adopt a dangerous-patient exception, for the federal courts to 
recognize such an exception would impede upon the confidentiality laws of the 
states.105
The court next considered the purposes of confidentiality laws and testimonial 
privileges.106  The court reasoned that the disclosure of the confidences of a patient to 
a psychotherapist when there is imminent harm to a third party is different than the 
disclosure of confidences in a court proceeding.107 When the confidences are 
disclosed in a trial proceeding the imminent danger no longer exists, therefore 
obliterating the necessity to disclose confidential information in order to protect third 
parties from harm.108
                                                                
95Id.
96Id.
97Id.; Chase, 301 F.3d 1019. 
98Chase, 301 F.3d at 1024. 
99Id.
100Id.
101Chase, 340 F.3d 978. 
102551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
103Chase, 340 F.3d at 985. 
104Id. at 985-86. 
105Id. at 986. 
106Id.
107Id.
108Id. at 987. 
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The third factor the court considered was the proposed rule to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.109  The proposed rule included nine privileges, including the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and three exceptions, excluding from the rule the 
dangerous-patient exception.110  The court considered this history as an indication of 
the Supreme Court’s position regarding a dangerous-patient exception to the 
privilege.111  The court’s final consideration was public policy.112  The court 
emphasized the importance of confidence and trust between a psychotherapist and a 
patient in order to have effective treatment.113  Based on the aforementioned factors, 
the court declined to recognize a dangerous-patient exception. 
VI.  THE RATIONALE IN UNITED STATES V. CHASE FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
NUMEROUS FACTORS THAT FAVOR THE RECOGNITION OF 
A DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION
In Chase, the Ninth Circuit considered four paramount reasons for concluding 
that there should not be a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege: (1) the “States’ Experiences”,114 (2) the “Differing Purposes of State 
Confidentiality Laws and the Federal Testimonial Privilege”,115 (3) the 1972 
Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence,116 and (4) Public Policy.117  The 
court, however, failed to address other factors that support the recognition of a 
dangerous-patient exception.  The court failed to acknowledge that (1) numerous 
states have created legislative exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient exception 
thereby impeding on state confidentiality laws; (2) the anticipated harm from the 
Tarasoff decision regarding the psychotherapist-patient relationship was not realized; 
(3) the proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence did not dismiss a dangerous-
patient exception; and (4) public policy actually supports an exception. 
A.  States Have Carved Out Numerous Exceptions to the Privilege  
The first factor considered in Chase was the experiences states have had creating 
exceptions to state psychotherapist-patient privileges.118  The court stressed that 
states’ experiences have opposed the adoption of a dangerous-patient exception and 
should the courts create such an exception, the courts would impede upon state laws 
                                                                
109Id. at 989. 
110Id.
111Id. at 989-90. 
112Id. at 990. 
113Id.
114Id. at 985. (emphasis in the original). 
115Id. at 986. (emphasis in the original). 
116Id. at 989. 
117Id. at 990. 
118Id. at 985. 
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of confidentiality.119  The court concluded that the federal courts should not 
recognize a dangerous-patient privilege because the states have not done so.120
Although not creating a specific dangerous-patient exception, state legislatures 
have impeded the state privilege by creating numerous exceptions to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege based on societal needs and public policy.  One 
such exception to the privilege is contained in New York State Social Services 
Law.121  The law requires certain individuals, including psychologists and social 
workers,  
to report or cause a report to be made . . . when they have reasonable 
cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their professional or 
official capacity is an abused or maltreated child, or . . . the parent, 
guardian, custodian or other person legally responsible for such child 
comes before them in their professional or official capacity . . . .122
New York law further provides that “[w]ritten reports from persons or officials 
required by this title to report shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings 
relating to child abuse or maltreatment.”123
The State of Washington allows confidential communications to be divulged if it 
is “[t]o appropriate law enforcement agencies and to a person, when the identity of 
the person is known to the public or private agency, whose health and safety has 
been threatened, or who is known to have been repeatedly harassed, by the 
patient.”124  Here, “a therapist has permission to disclose conversations if the patient 
has repeatedly harassed someone, even if the psychotherapist does not think that the 
patient presents a ‘serious danger of violence.’”125
An Illinois statute allows a therapist to refuse to reveal confidential information 
with the following exceptions: (1) when “the recipient introduces his mental 
condition or any aspect of his services received for such condition as an element of 
his claim or defense . . .”,126 (2) “after the recipient’s death when the recipient’s 
physical or mental condition has been introduced as an element of a claim or defense 
by any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the recipient  
. . .”,127 (3)  “to determine a recipient’s competency or need for guardianship . . .”,128
(4) “when disclosure is necessary to collect sums or receive third party payment 
                                                                
119Id. at 985-86. 
120Id. at 986. 
121N.Y. SOC. SERV. Law § 413(1) (McKinney 2003). 
122Id.
123Id. at § 415. 
124WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.390(10) (West 2004); see, e.g., Chase, 340 F.3d at 
987.
125Chase, 340 F.3d at 987; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.390(10).
126740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (West 2004). 
127Id. at 110/10(a)(2). 
128Id. at 110/10(a)(5). 
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representing charges for mental health or developmental disabilities services 
provided by a therapist or agency to a recipient . . . .”129
Even though state legislatures have not specifically created a dangerous-patient 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the legislatures have demonstrated 
that the privilege must give way in certain circumstances.  These statutes 
demonstrate that societal interests are of paramount concern and the confidentiality 
between a psychotherapist and a patient can be curtailed in pursuit of those interests. 
B.  The Purpose of the Testimonial Privilege Versus State Confidentiality Laws 
The court in Chase stated that the necessity for the disclosure of confidential 
information regarding a dangerous patient is no longer present at trial.130  This 
argument is flawed for three reasons.  First, there are states that permit a 
psychotherapist to testify in court even after the potential victim has been warned.  
Second, there are circumstances in which a patient has to be involuntary committed 
to an institution in order to prevent harm to a potential victim.  In those situations, 
the psychotherapist must provide testimony to convince the court that the individual 
should be committed against his will.  Finally, there are circumstances where the 
only evidence available in order to convict a defendant of harming or attempting to 
harm an individual is testimony from the psychotherapist. 
Focusing on the first point, under Ohio’s state law “[a] school guidance  
counselor . . . a professional clinical counselor, professional counselor, social 
worker, independent social worker, marriage and family therapist or independent 
marriage and family therapist . . . [or] a social work assistant . . .”131 shall not testify 
“concerning a confidential communication received from a client in that relation or 
the person’s advice to a client unless132 . . . [t]he communication or advice indicates 
clear and present danger to the client or other persons.”133   Here, Ohio law permits a 
psychotherapist to testify in court even after a potential victim has been warned.  
Second, the court in United States v. Hayes,134 stated that “psychotherapists will 
sometimes need to testify in court proceedings, such as those for the involuntary 
commitment of a patient, to comply with their ‘duty to protect’ the patient or 
identifiable third parties.”135  The court in Chase also conceded that “[s]tates 
generally allow psychotherapists to testify in civil commitment proceedings . . . .”136
In addition, Chase cited to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(1) which 
provides that “[t]here is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to 
an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the 
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the 
                                                                
129Id. at 110/10(a)(12). 
130Chase, 340 F.3d at 987. 
131OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G)(1) (West 2004). 
132Id.
133Id. at § 2317.02(G)(1)(a). 
134227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000). 
135Id. at 585. 
136Chase, 340 F.3d at 991. 
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patient is in need of hospitalization.”137  South Carolina has enacted a statute which 
allows a patient to prevent a therapist from disclosing information disclosed in 
confidence unless it involves “involuntary commitment proceedings, when a patient 
is diagnosed by a qualified professional as in need of commitment to a mental health 
facility for care of the patient’s mental illness . . . .”138  In situations where a therapist 
institutes involuntary commitment proceedings against an individual, the therapist 
must provide the respective information to the court by testifying. 
Finally, there will be some situations in which the only evidence against the 
defendant is the testimony offered by the psychotherapist.139  There may be some 
instances where the psychotherapist is the only witness who can testify to the 
patient’s alleged threats to harm another individual.  In those circumstances, courts 
should be permitted to allow the psychotherapist to testify in order to secure a 
conviction against the patient. 
C.  The Proposed Rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
The rule proposed by the Supreme Court to Congress regarding witness 
privileges was substantially different than the rule Congress actually enacted.140  The 
Court proposed nine federal privileges; however, Congress decided not to delineate 
specific privileges.141  One proposed privilege provided that “[a] patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his 
mental or emotional condition . . . .”142  The proposed exceptions to this proposed 
privilege were as follows:  
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization.  There is no privilege under this rule 
for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the 
patient for mental illness . . . . (2) Examination by order of judge.  If the 
judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the 
patient . . . . (3) Condition an element of claim or defense.  There is no 
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the 
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which 
he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense . . . .143
In Chase, the majority opinion argues against the adoption of a dangerous-patient 
exception because the Supreme Court had not recognized a dangerous-patient 
                                                                
137Id. (citing Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 504(d)(1)).   
138S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-90(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. 2004); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1004 (West 2004) (stating that there “is no privilege . . . in a proceeding to commit the 
patient . . . because of his alleged mental or physical condition.”). 
139See Chase, 340 F.3d at 998 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (stating in many instances the 
psychotherapist’s testimony may be the only credible testimony at trial). 
140FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note.
141Id.
14256 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972). 
143Id.
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exception in the proposed rule.144  Although a dangerous-patient exception was not 
listed among the proposed exceptions to the privilege, the Chase court failed to 
mention the exceptions that have been adopted by courts, which were not mentioned 
in the proposed exceptions.  For example, the crime-fraud exception to the privilege 
was not listed in the proposed exceptions; courts have, nonetheless recognized it as 
an exception.  Regardless, Congress declined to adopt the Supreme Court’s proposed 
rules or proposed exceptions. 
D.  Public Policy 
The theory that a patient will refuse to disclose everything to his psychotherapist 
because of fear that the psychotherapist may later use it against him has not been 
realized.  First, even if the psychotherapist were prohibited from testifying in court, 
the psychotherapist would still be permitted to reveal the communications to the 
authorities or to the potential victim.  The majority opinion in Chase argues that the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship would be severely tarnished if a psychotherapist 
were permitted to divulge what the patient had communicated to him in 
confidence.145  However, as Judge Kleinfeld so eloquently stated in the concurring 
opinion “[t]he cat being already out of the bag, trial is no occasion for stuffing it 
back in.”146  The majority of courts and legislatures have agreed that a 
psychotherapist is permitted to divulge confidential communications in order to warn 
the authorities and/or a potential victim.  By warning others, the psychotherapist has 
already breached the psychotherapist-patient relationship.147  Therefore, the 
anticipated harm caused to the psychotherapist-patient relationship has already been 
realized.   
When the decision was published in Tarasoff, there was concern that patients 
would no longer seek the necessary psychiatric treatment because of the possibility 
that confidential communications may be revealed by the psychotherapist.148  The 
mental health profession did not welcome the decision at first, believing that it would 
“unduly compromise confidentiality and interfere with treatment.”149  Nonetheless, it 
is “now clear that the concerns about the potential loss of confidentiality have not 
had the adverse impact on psychiatric practice that . . . [was] predicted.”150  “[M]ore 
than 25 years later . . . such a chilling effect or detrimental impact upon therapy has 
not occurred.”151  This cause for concern regarding the dissolution of the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship, providing that a therapist is permitted to testify 
in court, will also not be realized.  A therapist being allowed to testify in court will 
                                                                
144Chase, 340 F.3d at 989.
145Id. at 990. 
146Id. at 998 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
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not be the determinate factor for a patient when deciding whether or not to seek 
treatment.  Similar to the concern after the Tarasoff decision, the concern here will 
also not be realized. 
Another public policy concern is the possibility of a psychotherapist facing civil 
liability to a patient if the psychotherapist reveals confidential communications.  
States have anticipated this concern and have created statutes to protect 
psychotherapists from being sued by their patients when psychotherapists reveal 
confidential communications.  For example, the Utah Legislature has enacted a 
statute which states that “[a] therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to 
provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when 
that client or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical 
violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.”152  The statute 
continues that “[n]o cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or 
privilege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist’s 
communication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in 
accordance with Subsection (1).”153
VI.  COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED A DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION
The decision in Chase did not resolve the question of whether the courts should 
recognize a dangerous-patient exception.  The question lingers while a number of 
other courts are addressing the issue.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court will determine 
the issue; until then, the courts can rely on the guidance and wisdom of other courts.  
One court has specifically recognized a dangerous-patient exception.154  Other courts 
have indicated that there are circumstances where such an exception would exist.155
A. United States v. Glass 
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Glass156 recognized the dangerous-patient 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  In Glass, the defendant was 
voluntarily seeking treatment for his mental illness at a mental institution.157  While 
seeking treatment, the defendant admitted to a psychotherapist that he intended to 
shoot Bill and Hillary Clinton.158  Notwithstanding this threat, the defendant was 
released from the institution on the condition that he remained at his father’s 
home.159  Upon discovering that the defendant failed to comply with the condition, 
the psychotherapist informed the authorities of the defendant’s statement.160  The 
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defendant was charged with “knowingly and willfully threatening to kill the 
President of the United States.”161
The defendant moved to prohibit the use of the psychotherapist’s statement at 
trial asserting the psychotherapist-patient privilege established in Jaffee.162  The 
government contended that the evidence should be admitted based on the Supreme 
Court’s suggestion in Jaffee that exceptions exist.163  The government premised its 
argument on a footnote in the Jaffee opinion, which stated that that the court does 
“not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for 
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by 
means of a disclosure by the therapist.”164  The Glass court interpreted this statement 
by the Supreme Court to establish an exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in situations where there is a “serious threat of harm to the patient or to 
others [and the harm] can be averted only be means of a disclosure by the 
therapist.”165  The court therefore remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether “the threat was serious when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was 
the only means of averting harm to the President when the disclosure was made.”166
B. United States v. Hayes 
During psychotherapy sessions, the defendant, Hayes, informed his 
psychotherapist of his intention to harm his supervisor at work in the U.S. Postal 
Office.167  The therapist warned the potential victim.168  The potential victim 
requested to obtain all of the therapy records regarding Hayes’ treatment.169  The 
therapist provided the records and Hayes was charged with threatening to kill a 
federal official.170  At trial, Hayes filed a motion to preclude these therapy records 
from being entered into evidence and further to prevent his therapist from 
testifying.171  Citing Glass, “the district court held that a psychotherapist may testify 
as to otherwise privileged statements of threats allegedly made by a patient only 
where such ‘disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the [federal official] 
when the disclosure was made.’”172  The court granted the defendant’s motion 
finding that the “disclosure was not ‘the only way of averting harm.’”173  The court 
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based its decision on testimony by the therapist indicating that he did not consider 
any other avenue besides disclosing the confidential information.174  The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.  In its opinion, the court expressed 
that it did not support the adoption of a dangerous-patient exception.  The court did, 
however, acknowledge that in some circumstances the privilege may be waived.175
The court stated that “in order to secure a valid waiver of the protections of the 
psychotherapist/patient privilege from a patient, a psychotherapist must provide that 
patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver suited to the unique 
needs of that patient.”176  A patient can waive the privilege “by disclosing the 
substance of therapy sessions to unrelated third parties.”177  The court further stated 
that it was not creating a test to determine whether the privilege had been waived, 
but that it would be determined on a case-by-case basis.178  Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that the defendant had not waived his privilege in this case.179
C. United States v. Bishop
In United States v. Bishop,180 the defendant, Bishop, was convicted of murdering 
an individual at the psychiatric hospital.181  During the investigations of the incident, 
Bishop informed officers that he had committed the crime.182  At trial, asserting the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, Bishop objected to the testimony of a doctor and 
nurse to whom he had told incriminating statements.183  The district court denied the 
motion because Bishop had waived the privilege by previously disclosing that 
information to law enforcement officials.184   The Sixth Circuit agreed with the 
district court, holding Bishop had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by 
disclosing the information to a third party.185
VII.  CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court “in light of [its] reason and experience”186 has 
recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The Court has, however, left 
lingering questions for the lower courts to determine regarding possible exceptions to 
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the privilege.  The lower courts have used their own reason and experience to 
develop exceptions to the privilege.  Such exceptions include the crime-fraud 
exception, waiver exception, and the dangerous-patient exception.  “Inevitably other 
exceptions will follow . . . .”187  The Supreme Court should recognize a dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege to allow a psychotherapist 
to testify in court when there is “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others” 
and it can only be averted “by means of disclosure by” the therapist.188  The Court 
should recognize the exception because it would not impede on state confidentiality 
laws, it would not impede on the confidential psychotherapist-patient relationship, 
Congress did not dismiss this exception, and the exception is supported by public 
policy. 
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